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permanently. .
KEYWORDS: baby, court, social services
Does the Constitution Guarantee Court-Appointed
Counsel When the Plea is "Don't take my Baby
Away"? Lassiter v. Department of Social Services
An impoverished mother has no constitutional right to a lawyer's
help in resisting a state's attempt to take her child away
permanently. .... 1
The preceding quote illustrates the press' view of the Supreme
Court's decision in Lassiter v. Department of Social Services.'
In its five-four decision the majority held that court-appointed
counsel is not a matter of right in state proceedings to permanently
remove a child from his parent's custody. This decision is Justice Potter
Stewart's legacy to the nation.
The Supreme Court has recognized a constitutional obligation to
provide counsel in criminal cases but it has not yet extended that obli-
gation to include non-juvenile civil proceedings.3 The constitutional
source of the obligation is found in the fourteenth amendment which
provides "no state shall. . . deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-
erty, without due process of law. . . .- In criminal cases one's life or
liberty is in danger of deprivation. In civil cases one's money or prop-
erty is usually endangered. Between the extremes of loss of life or lib-
erty and loss of money or property, lies the loss of one's parental rights.
The issue in Lassiter, which focused on this intermediate gray area,
was whether due process is violated when the state attempts to judi-
cially terminate parental rights without appointing counsel for the
parent.
It is necessary to review the Court's factual account given in
1. Miami Herald, June 2, 1981, at 4a, col. 1.
2. - U.S. ___, 101 S. Ct. 2153 (1981).
3. Note, Court Appointment of Attorneys in Civil Cases; The Constitutionality
of Uncompensated Legal Assistance, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 366, 382 (1981).
4. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Lassiter and the historical development of the right to counsel as well
as other due process considerations in civil contexts in order to under-
stand not only the significance of Lassiter but also the opposing conclu-
sions reached by the majority and dissenting justices. It appears, from
the constitutional standards applied by the Lassiter Court that the ma-
jority considered loss of a child more nearly akin to loss of property
than to loss of liberty.5 Therefore, the differing standards used by the
justices in deciding the nature of the process due, will also be
examined.
I. The Court's Narration of the Facts
The facts of Lassiter are important because Ms. Lassiter was an
atypical petitioner in this civil case. In addition, Justice Stewart, for
the majority, and Justice Blackmun, for the minority, differed signifi-
cantly in their interpretation of the relevant events.
In 1975, the District Court of Durham County, North Carolina,
adjudicated petitioner's infant son a neglected child." That court based
its decision on evidence that Abby Gail Lassiter had not given her son
proper medical care. As a result, the infant was transferred to the cus-
tody of the Durham County Department of Social Services. Later, in
1976, Ms. Lassiter was convicted of second degree murder,7 and sen-
tenced to serve twenty-five to forty years in prison.8 Two years later, in
1978, the Department of Social Services petitioned the district court to
terminate Ms. Lassiter's parental rights,9 basing its petition on a de-
partment evaluation that she "ha[d] not had contact with the child
since December of 1975. " 10 In the majority's opinion, this statement
seemed to raise the inference that Ms. Lassiter chose not to see her son
because of her disinterest in him. In contrast, the dissent pointed out
5. See pp. 299-305 infra, for discussion of due process standards applied in
Lassiter.
6. 101 S. Ct. at 2156.
7. This conviction stemmed from stab wounds Ms. Lassiter inflicted upon an in-
dividual whom her mother was beating with a broom when Ms. Lassiter entered her
mother's apartment. Id. at 2156 n.1.
8. Id. at 2156.
9. Id. at 2156-57.
10. Id. at 2157 (emphasis supplied).
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that Ms. Lassiter did not voluntarily neglect to contact her son, but
was unable to do so because she was in prison.""1
According to Justice Stewart, who wrote the opinion for the ma-
jority, Ms. Lassiter was notified that the Department of Social Services
had a hearing date to seek to terminate her parental rights.1 2 Although
Ms. Lassiter's mother had retained counsel to assist in efforts to invali-
date her murder conviction, Ms. Lassiter never mentioned the termina-
tion proceeding to him; she only mentioned it to "'someone'" at the
prison.18 The majority implied this omission signified Lassiter was in-
different to her rights regarding her son. The dissent, however, related
this incident in a different light. Justice Blackmun stated that when
Lassiter was advised of the pending termination proceeding "[she] im-
mediately expressed strong opposition to that plan and indicated a de-
sire to place the child with his grandmother. 1 4 Justice Blackmun also
noted Lassiter was not informed she had a right to be represented by
counsel at the termination hearing.
Ms. Lassiter was brought from prison to the hearing on Aug. 31,
1978.15 The Department of Social Services'1 6 sole witness was a social
worker who detailed the medical neglect of the infant and stated the
child should not be placed with his grandmother, who was caring for
Ms. Lassiter's four other children. Following this testimony the court
advised Ms. Lassiter to cross-examine the witness. Justice Stewart de-
scribed this event:
Ms. Lassiter conducted a cross-examination of the social worker,
who firmly reiterated her earlier testimony. The judge explained
several times, with varying degrees of clarity, that Ms. Lassiter
should only ask questions at this stage; many of her questions were
disallowed because they were not really questions, but arguments.17
11. Id. at 2173.
12. Id. at 2157.
13. Id.
14. Id. at 2173.
15. Id. at 2157.
16. It is interesting to note that in the majority opinion Lassiter's adversary is
called "Department" while in the dissent it is called the "State." See, e.g., id. at 2157,
2168.
17. 101 S. Ct. at 2157 (emphasis added).
2911Parental Rights & Appointed Counsel1 6:1982
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In contrast Justice Blackmun pointed out that the testimony of the
Department's sole witness consisted of inadmissible hearsay evidence,
to which Ms. Lassiter made no objection. Justice Blackmun aptly noted
that while "[t]he court gave petitioner an opportunity to cross-examine
the social worker, . . . she apparently did not understand that cross-
examination required questioning rather than declarative
statements." 18
Ms. Lassiter testified she had properly cared for her son and ex-
pressed her desire that he live with his grandmother, brothers and sis-
ters. 19 On appeal from the termination of parental rights, Lassiter's
only argument was that the trial court erred in failing to appoint coun-
sel for her.2
The differing versions of the facts may perhaps be explained by
the effect petitioner's character had upon the Court: She was not
merely an ineffective parent, but a convicted murderess. The majority
implied termination of parental rights was the only proper outcome in
this particular case, and it is arguable that the Court's preoccupation
with this result prompted a misapplication of logic and law. Through-
out the majority opinion petitioner's character seemingly hangs like a
shadow over the logic of the Court. A more "worthy" petitioner might
have fared better.21
Given the facts in this case the Court's grant of certiorari was
itself questionable. Justice Burger, concurring in the majority opinion,
stated: "Given the record in this case, which involves the parental
rights of a mother under lengthy sentence for murder who showed little
interest in her son, the writ might well have been a 'candidate' for dis-
missal as improvidently granted.'2 2 Neither Justice Burger nor the
18. Id. at 2173 (footnotes and citations omitted) (emphasis added). At this point
the dissent includes testimony from the termination hearing which demonstrates that
Ms. Lassiter had no notion as to the nature of cross-examination. The judge was impa-
tient and discourteous to her, and all opportunity to present a meaningful defense was
lost. Id. at 2173 n.22.
19. Id. at 2157-58.
20. Id. at 2158.
21. Perhaps a more "worthy" petitioner would not be a convicted murderess,
have had a number of children out of wedlock, or be imprisoned for several decades
and unable to personally care for her child. In Lassiter, all these factors combined to
make the petitioner particularly unappealing.
22. 101 S. Ct. at 2163 (emphasis added).
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other justices explain why certiorari was granted.
II. Historical Development of Right to Counsel23
The Supreme Court had never before heard a case involving the
right to counsel in the context of parental rights termination. 4 Since
the Court had not extended the right to court-appointed counsel to non-
juvenile civil cases,25 it was necessary for the Lassiter Court to consider
both the right to counsel in criminal cases and the due process given in
civil cases.
The extension of fourteenth amendment due process guarantees to
include the right to state appointed counsel is a recent development. In
1932 the Court, in Powell v. Alabama28 determined due process re-
quired courts to assign counsel for indigent defendants in capital cases.
However, the Powell Court declined to determine whether that right
extended to other criminal prosecutions.2
Addressing the appointment of counsel in Lassiter the Court's
analysis began with Betts v. Brady' 8 In Betts, the Court refused to
extend the automatic right to counsel for indigents charged with non-
capital criminal offenses, deciding that state courts had the power to
appoint counsel, or not, as they deemed proper.29 Betts held sway for
over twenty years, until the case-by-case approach was overruled in the
landmark decision Gideon v. Wainwright."°
In Gideon the Court expanded the automatic right to counsel to
include all non-capital felony cases. This shift from Betts demonstrated
the Court's concern for fundamental fairness: "[R]eason and reflection
require us to recognize that in our adversary system of criminal justice,
23. The historical development of the right to counsel is also treated in Note,
Constitutional Law - Due Process - Indigent Parents' Right to Counsel in Child Neg-
lect Cases, 46 TENN. L. REV. 649 (1979).
24. The Supreme Court denied certiorari in a case similar to Lassiter in Kauf-
man v. Carter, 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678, cert. denied, 402 U.S. 964
(1971). See discussion at p. 295 infra.
25. See note 3 supra.
26. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
27. Id. at 71.
28. 316 U.S. 455 (1942).
29. Id. at 473.
30. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
2931
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any person haled into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be
assured a fair trial unless counsel is provided for him. This seems to us
to be an obvious truth." '3
In the twenty years since Gideon, the Court decided several cases
specifically bearing on Lassiter. The Court found the right to appointed
counsel existed in juvenile proceedings where a child faced institution-
alization in a juvenile detention facility.32 In addition the Court found
the right to counsel exists in any prosecution threatening any length of
imprisonment.33 Of the five justices reaching the merits in Vitek v.
Jones,34 four concluded counsel must be appointed for a prisoner in a
proceeding to transfer him from prison to a mental hospital. 5
Further expansion of the right to counsel was later inhibited by
Morrisey v. Brewer and Gagnon v. Scarpelli.36 In Morrisey, the Court
held an informal pre-revocation hearing must precede parole revoca-
tion, but declined to decide whether the parolee was entitled to assis-
tance of counsel, whether retained or appointed.37 In Gagnon, the
Court admitted that counsel might be necessary to assure due process
in parole revocation proceedings, but decided a case-by-case approach
was adequate to determine whether counsel should be appointed.38 The
31. Id. at 344.
32. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Although a juvenile proceeding is not a crim-
inal trial, the Court reasoned that the danger of incarceration in a juvenile detention
institution was comparable to imprisonment. The penalty of incarceration, rather than
the nature of the proceeding, made the presence of counsel requisite. Id. at 12-31.
33. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The Court held "that absent
knowing and intelligent waiver, no person may be imprisoned for any offense, whether
classified as petty, misdemeanor or felony, unless he was represented by counsel at his
trial." Id. at 37. In any proceeding - no matter how minor - where incarceration
might result, the right to counsel was definitively assured.
34. 445 U.S. 480 at 497 (1980).
35. Id. The fifth justice concluded that some independent assistance should be
provided to an inmate in such a proceeding, but that assistance need not necessarily be
a licensed attorney.
36. 408 U.S. 471 (1972); 411 U.S. 778 (1973).
37. 408 U.S. at 489.
38. 411 U.S. at 790. The Court reasoned that revocation of parole or probation
was not part of a criminal trial and therefore the full due process protections of crimi-
nal trials did not apply. Id. at 781. It is interesting to note that in In re Gault, the
nature of the punishment was the determining factor in requiring the appointment of
counsel, even though the juvenile proceeding was not considered a criminal one. In
6
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Lassiter Court relied on these cases to justify its affirmation of the
case-by-case approach in deciding whether counsel need be appointed.
In the civil arena, the Supreme Court had not, before Lassiter,
reached the merits of the right to counsel issue in termination of paren-
tal rights proceedings. The opportunity presented itself in 1971, when
Kaufman v. Carter,3 9 a case remarkably similar to Lassiter, came
before the Court. The Court denied certiorari,4 0 refusing to decide
whether an indigent mother was entitled to court-appointed counsel in
a state initiated civil suit seeking to declare her an unfit mother and
obtain custody of five of her seven children. Justice Black, dissenting
from the denial of certiorari, argued the Court should have heard the
case and counsel should have been appointed:
The necessity of state-appointed counsel is particularly acute in
cases like one of those before us, Kaufman v. Carter, where the
state initiates a civil proceeding against an individual to deprive her
of custody of her children. Here the state is employing the judicial
mechanism it has created to enforce society's will upon an individ-
ual and take away her children. The case by its very nature resem-
bles a criminal prosecution. The defendant is charged with con-
duct-the failure to care properly for her children-which may be
criminal and which in any event is viewed as reprehensible and
morally wrong by a majority of society. And the cost of being un-
successful is dearly high-loss of the companionship of one's
children.41
Davis v. Page,42 a fifth circuit case, also involved the right to
court-appointed counsel in a parental rights proceeding. In Davis, the
Gagnon, on the other hand, the fact that the revocation of parole or probation was not
part of a criminal proceeding seems to be the determining factor in not requiring ap-
pointment of counsel, even though the result, as in In re Gault, might be incarceration.
39. Meltzer v. C. Buck LeCraw & Co., 402 U.S. 954 (1971), discussing denial
of certiorari in Kaufman, 402 U.S. 964 (1971).
40. Id. at 964. Although Justice Black's dissent to denial of certiorari in Kauf-
man seems directly related to the issues in Lassiter, the Court makes no mention of his
opinion in Lassiter.
41. Id. at 959 (emphasis added).
42. 618 F.2d 374 (5th Cir. 1980), modified, 640 F.2d 599 (5th Cir. 1981) (en
banc), petition for cert. filed, sub nom. Chastain v. Davis, 50 U.S.L.W. 3109 (U.S.
May 7, 1981) (No. 80-1888).
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hearing concerned removal of the child from the parent's custody s
while in Lassiter the hearing concerned the final termination of all pa-
rental rights. 44 Unlike Ms. Lassiter, the parent in Davis had no crimi-
nal record. The fifth circuit determined the parent was indeed entitled
to a court appointed attorney to assure compliance with due process. 45
Lassiter may have a negative effect on the decision in Davis, since
Davis will probably be vacated and remanded for reconsideration in
light of Lassiter.6 It is interesting to speculate whether the Supreme
Court would have overruled the fifth circuit decision in Davis, had
Davis come before the Court prior to Lassiter.
Since decisions specifically involving the right to appointed counsel
have been mainly limited to criminal cases, the Lassiter Court was
compelled to analyze due process requirements in civil cases generally,
rather than the right to counsel specifically. The right to counsel is one
aspect of due process. In deciding what process was due in Lassiter, the
Court relied on its decision in Mathews v. Eldridge.7
Since 1976 when Eldridge was decided, it has been the tool with
which the Court decides due process issues.48 Eldridge articulated a
three-pronged test to be applied in due process determinations: "First,
the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second,
the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interests, through the proce-
dure used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally the Government's interest, . ..
The guideposts of Eldridge were generated by the Court's earlier
decisions in civil due process cases.50 In Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy
43. Id. at 375.
44. 101 S. Ct. at 2156, 2157.
45. 640 F.2d at 604.
46. See note 42 supra. If Davis should be remanded, the case-by-case approach
mandated by Lassiter would be applied. However, the lower court could still decide
that in this particular case the parent is entitled to a court appointed attorney.
47. 101 S. Ct. at 2159 citing 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
48. See Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977); Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div.
v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1 (1978); Little v. Streater, - U.S. -, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981). In
these cases the Eldridge factors were applied to evaluate the procedural due process
necessary when a drivers license was to be revoked, utilities were to be shut-off, and
paternity to be adjudicated.
49. 424 U.S. at 335 (emphasis added).
50. See Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961) (right to a hearing
8
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the Court considered the litigant's private interests-loss of government
employment.5 1 In Goldberg v. Kelly,52 the Court considered the impor-
tance of the private interest in determining the timing of a hearing for
termination of welfare benefits,53 and found the private interest impor-
tant enough to require a pre- rather than post-termination hearing be
afforded.5 4 Goldberg evaluated and weighed the government's interest
in protecting the poor and avoiding increased fiscal burdens.55
In both Richardson v. Perales" and Kelly the Court considered
the risk of erroneous deprivation as part of the due process issue. In
Perales physicians' reports were deemed sufficient evidence for finding
nondisability in a claim for Social Security disability benefits.57 The
procedure carried with it a low risk of erroneous deprivation, and it can
be inferred from the Court's reasoning that the low risk was a factor in
the decision."" In Kelly however, the evidence relied on in terminating
welfare benefits was severely subject to "honest error or irritable mis-
judgment. . . -59 Since the risk of erroneous deprivation was great,
the Court required a pre-termination hearing in this case. 0
In Eldridge the Court adroitly interwove and balanced these con-
siderations to formulate the factors necessary for fulfillment of due pro-
cess requisites. As the culmination of a long line of due process deci-
for firing); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (timing of hearing for termination
of welfare benefits); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971) (nature of hearing required
for suspension of drivers license); Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971) (type of
procedure required for claim of Social Security disability benefits); Fuentes v. Shevin,
407 U.S. 67 (1972) (timing of hearing in seizure of property in replevin); Stanley v.
Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972) (right to a hearing for unwed father's custody of child);
Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974) (timing of hearing for firing); Fusari v. Stein-
berg, 419 U.S. 379 (1975) (nature of procedure for eligibility for unemployment
compensation).
51. 367 U.S. at 895-96. In addition, the Court made reference to the govern-
ment's interest in security. Id. at 899.
52. 397 U.S. 254.
53. Id. at 264.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 264-65.
56. 402 U.S. 389.
57. Id. at 404.
58. Id. at 405.
59. 397 U.S. at 266 citing Kelly v. Wyman, 294 F. Supp. 893 at 904-05.
60. Id. at 261.
297 1
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sions, Eldridge provides a clear and useful tool for all due process
determinations. Nevertheless, the application of Eldridge in Lassiter
vas not without conflict.
Due process considerations in civil cases have usually involved the
right to a hearing, the timing of the hearing, or the nature of the hear-
ing or procedure in question.61 In Lassiter, there was no question of
entitlement to a hearing, nor was the timing of the hearing at issue.
Rather, the nature of the hearing was the subject of evaluation, and the
Court used the Eldridge guideposts to determine whether the hearing
in Lassiter passed due process muster. The facts in Lassiter were an
important ingredient under the Eldridge due process formula. The
stakes were not mere property interests, but the benefits and rights of
family life. The Court recognized the magnitude of the parent's interest
in the custody of his child. 2
Although the constitution does not specifically state that familial
interests are constitutionally protected, a long line of cases have found
such constitutional protection for rights existing within the realm of
marriage, sexual matters, and child-rearing.6" In its treatment of due
process issues in familial rights cases the Court has held a right to a
hearing exists in a case involving a child custody decree obtained in an
ex parte divorce action, 4 as well as in a case involving child custody
rights of unwed fathers. 5 In Stanley v. Illinois,66 an Illinois statute
was construed to mean an unwed father could be denied, without a
hearing, custody of his children upon the death of the mother.6 7 The
unwed father was presumed unfit. The Supreme Court held that a
hearing was required before a father could be deprived of his chil-
61. See note 50 supra.
62. 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
63. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (involuntary sterilization); Gris-
wold v. Connecticut, 383 U.S. 479 (1965) (contraception); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973) (abortion); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978) (right to marry).
64. May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1952).
65. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
66. Id.
67. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § § 702-1, 702-4, 701-14. The pertinent language of
the statute defines a parent as "the father and mother of a legitimate child, or the
survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child." § 701-14. The defini-
tion of parent did not include the natural father of an illegitimate child.
10
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dren.68 The Court in Lassiter considered these cases to underscore the
magnitude of parental interest in child custody.69
Nevertheless, using the due process considerations enumerated in
Eldridge,7" and the historical fact that the right to appointed counsel
exists mainly in criminal cases, the majority concluded that Ms.
Lassiter did not have a right to appointed counsel.
III. The Majority Rationale
The majority's conclusion must be viewed in light of the facts it
found persuasive: Ms. Lassiter repeatedly stabbed another human be-
ing, inflicting death; she was convicted for this murder; she was serving
a twenty-five to forty year prison sentence; she was, therefore, an unfit
mother. The majority implied that Ms. Lassiter could not, and should
not have won custody of her son under the circumstances. To some
critics the majority's treatment of the general issue of whether a parent
was entitled to court-appointed counsel appears subordinate to its inter-
est in a particular result for the particular petitioner.
Cases involving due process issues require a two tier inquiry. First,
is the specific interest involved one entitled to fourteenth amendment
due process protection? Second, if entitlement is demonstrated, what
degree of due process protection is appropriate?71
There is no doubt that a parent's interest in raising his child is
entitled to some due process protection. In Stanley, the Court specifi-
cally stated "[t]he integrity of the family unit has found protection in
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 72 This point is
so well settled that Lassiter only addressed the second question and
decided the degree of procedural protection due.
Based on its historical analysis of the right to counsel, the majority
found a presumption rooted in the criminal context, that "an indigent
litigant has a right to appointed counsel only when, if he loses, he may
be deprived of his physical liberty."73 The majority presumed no right
68. 405 U.S. at 658.
69. 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
70. See discussion at p. 296 supra.
71. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 507 (1978).
72. 405 U.S. 645 at 651 (citations omitted).
73. 101 S. Ct. at 2159.
299 1Parental Rights & Appointed Counsel16:1982
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to counsel existed because no loss of physical liberty was at stake in
Lassiter. This presumption was balanced against the three Eldridge el-
ements7 4 to decide what process was due. The composite analytic pic-
ture was thus comprised of private interests, government interests, and
risk of erroneous decisions on the one hand, and the presumption that
appointed counsel is not constitutionally guaranteed where incarcera-
tion is not threatened, on the other.75
Applying the Eldridge test, the Lassiter majority acknowledged a
parent's interest in the custody of his child is great"6 and then rapidly
proceeded to evaluation of the state's interest. According to the major-
ity the state's interest is not only the child's welfare, 7 but also the
desire to make judicial decisions in the most economical manner.78 The
majority wanted to avoid imposing upon the states the expense of
court-appointed counsel, 9 as well as the added costs of the lengthened
and more complex proceeding likely to result from the assignment of
counsel."0
While superficially enticing, the soundness of this reasoning seems
debatable. In a case-by-case approach the lower court will have to
determine whether counsel need be appointed in a particular case.
Cleaver v. Wilcox"1 suggested three factors to be considered when de-
ciding whether to appoint counsel to fulfill due process requirements in
74. The Court in Lassiter stated that Eldridge propounded three elements to be
evaluated in deciding the requirements of due process and that the Court must balance
these three elements. The majority gave no reason as to why it deemed the Eldridge
elements proper for application to Lassiter, other than that the Eldridge elements con-
cern due process. Id.
75. Id.
76. 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id. According to the majority in Lassiter, thirty-three states and the District
of Columbia have statutes which already provide for the appointment of counsel in
termination of parental rights and child dependency cases. Id. at 2163. It appears the
majority declined to impose upon the states that which the majority of states have seen
fit to impose upon themselves.
80. Id. at 2160.
81. 499 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1974). This was a class action seeking the right to
appointment of counsel in child dependency proceedings. An amendment to the Cali-
fornia Statutes - CAL. STATS. WELF. & INST. CODE § 600 (Deering) see also § 318.5,
now provides for counsel as a matter of right in this type of proceeding.
Nova Law Journal 6:1982
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a child dependency proceeding: (1) length of probable parent-child sep-
aration; (2) presence or absence of parental consent or disputed facts;
(3) the parent's ability to handle relevant documents and examination
of witnesses at the proceeding. 2 The preceeding factors will necessarily
vary and warrant individualized evaluation in each case, although each
state may create its own guidelines. To use this method, the judge
needs to investigate each case, familiarize himself with the abilities of
the parents, and determine their capacity to proceed pro se. Is it more
economical to allot a judge's time to these inquiries, than to require
automatic appointment of counsel upon determination of indigency? If
judicial economy is a valid state interest it appears the Wilcox case-by-
case approach defeats rather than serves this interest. The majority ad-
mitted, however, the state's pecuniary interests in Lassiter were insuffi-
cient to overcome the parental interests represented in the case.83
The third Eldridge factor concerns the possibility that erroneous
decisions will result from the procedures currently used. This factor re-
quires the court to consider whether the proposed procedure will signifi-
cantly affect the outcome in a particular case. In Lassiter, the Court
framed the inquiry as whether "a parent will be erroneously deprived
of his or her child because the parent is not represented by counsel."84
In answering the question the majority acknowledged in some cases
parents might risk erroneous deprivation since, without counsel, they
could not adequately represent their interests.85 However, this would
not necessarily occur in every situation.8 6
The majority stated that the weight of the Eldridge factors might
rebut the presumption against appointed counsel in some cases but not
in others.8 7 For example, in a particular case where state's interests are
strong, private interests weak, and risk of erroneous decision slight, the
presumption against appointed counsel would not be rebutted. How-
ever, where the state's interests are slight, private interests great, and
risk of error high, the presumption might be rebutted.8 8 Since the
82. Id. at 945.
83. 101 S. Ct. at 2160.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 2161.
86. Id. at 2162.
87. Id.
88. Id.
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weight of the Eldridge factors differ in each case, the majority adopted
the case-by-case approach established in Gagnon as the proper method
for deciding when counsel should be appointed.8 9
The application of this balancing test will be troublesome for lower
courts. The majority did not explain the circumstances under which
state interests could outweigh parental interest. Nor does the majority
explain why courts should not defer to any risk of error where potential
loss is great and the parent unrepresented.
Applying the case-by-case approach to Lassiter the majority con-
cluded Ms. Lassiter had no right to counsel. In the majority's view the
risk of error was slight because "the case presented no specially troub-
lesome points of law, either procedural or substantive,"9' 0 and "that
counsel for Ms. Lassiter could not have made a determinative differ-
ence."'" Since the majority believed the presence of counsel could not
have changed the outcome in Lassiter, it did not evaluate the need for
counsel in termination proceedings generally.
IV. The Dissent's Counterpoint
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun recognized his breth-
ren's failure to look beyond petitioner's character in the Lassiter deci-
sion. "[T]he issue before the Court is not petitioner's character; it is
whether she was given a meaningful opportunity to be heard ... .
Justice Blackmun did not question the propriety of the application
of Eldridge but applied them himself, to reach the opposite conclusion:
due process required the appointment of counsel for an indigent parent
threatened with judicial termination of parental rights.
Evaluating the Eldridge test, Justice Blackmun, like the majority,
acknowledged the importance of the first factor-parental interest. He
emphasized, however, the magnitude of this interest to a greater extent
than the majority.9" Evaluating the second Eldridge factor-state in-
terests-Justice Blackmun easily dismissed the state's financial interest
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 2175.
93. Id. at 2166.
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as a limited one, 4 while admititng the state's interest in the welfare of
the child is a legitimate one.9 5 The Justice pointed out, however, that
the child's protection is not occasioned by unnecessarily removing him
from his biological parents.96 Therefore, it seems the state's interest
would best be served by affording procedural protections in termination
proceedings so as to assure against unnecessary or erroneous parent-
child separations. It seems obvious appointment of counsel would be
the very sort of procedural protection aiding the state in its goal of
preventing unnecessary separations. Both the dissent and the majority
agreed, however, that the state's interest in Lassiter was not the dispos-
itive factor that tipped the scales against court-appointed counsel.9 7
The final Eldridge factor-possibility of erroneous depriva-
tion-was the factor that caused most divergence between majority and
dissenting views. The majority believed in some cases risk of erroneous
deprivation would not be "insupportably high." '98 The dissent, on the
contrary, stated that risk of error in this type of proceeding assumed
"extraordinary proportion."991 According to Justice Blackmun, the risk
of error was great because the legal issues were not simple.100 "The
parent cannot possibly succeed without being able to identify material
issues, develop defenses, gather and present sufficient supporting non-
hearsay evidence, and conduct cross-examination of adverse wit-
nesses." 10 1 It would be a rare parent who could perform those adver-
sarial functions successfully. Justice Blackmun called the majority's ac-
knowledgment that these factors "'may . . . overwhelm an
uncounselled parent' a profound understatement. 1 0 2
Based on its evaluation of the Eldridge factors, the dissent found
illogical the majority's conclusion that counsel need not be appointed in
every case.10 3 But while the opinions' divergence in the factor analysis
94. Id. at 2170.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2170.
98. Id. at 2162.
99. Id. at 2170.
100. Id. at 2169.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 2171.
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was not insignificant, the critical difference between majority and dis-
senting approaches focused on the manner in which Eldridge was ap-
plied. Justice Blackmun asserted that the case-by-case approach in this
context reflected erroneous application of EldridgeT10 because it neces-
sitated judicial evaluation of litigants. Rather than evaluating different
litigants within a given context, the correct inquiry concerns due pro-
cess needs arising within different legal contexts.10 5 Justice Blackmun
supported this reasoning: "But procedural due process rules are shaped
by the risk of error inherent in the truth-finding process as applied to
the generality of cases, not to rare exceptions." 0 6
The majority's decision in Lassiter is most vulnerable on this
point. In Eldridge, the three-step test was applied to the proceeding
involved in termination of disability benefits, rather than to the litigant,
in order to determine constitutional sufficiency of the nature and timing
of the procedure.1 07 It is clear from the Eldridge decision that the
Court intended the test to be used in evaluating procedures rather than
litigants; the decision turned not on the facts surrounding Mr. El-
dridge's loss of benefits but on the termination proceedings in gen-
eral.108 Moreover, in the Court's succeeding applications of Eldridge it
has consistently applied the test to legal contexts rather than to liti-
gants.109 It is amazing if not ironic that in Little v. Streater,110 decided
the same day as Lassiter, the Court applied Eldridge in a manner con-
104. Id. at 2171.
105. Id.
106. Id. citing Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344.
107. 424 U.S. at 336.
108. Id.
109. See Hortonville Joint School Dist. No. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426
U.S. 482 at 494 (1976) (procedures for firing teachers); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 at 675 (1977) (procedure for inflicting corporal punishment in public schools);
Smith v. Organization of Foster Families for Equality & Reform, 431 U.S. 816 at 849
(1977) (procedures for removal of foster children from foster homes); Board of Cura-
tors of the University of Missouri v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 at 86 n.3 (1978) (proce-
dures for dismissal of students for academic deficiencies); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S.
247 at 259 (1978) (procedures for suspension of public school students); Memphis
Light, Gas & Water Division v. Craft, 431 U.S. 1 at 17-18 (1978) (procedures for
terminating utility services); Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418 at 425 (1979) (civil
proceeding to commit an individual to a state mental hospital).
110. 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981).
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sistent with previous decisions. It used the three-pronged test to evalu-
ate private interests, state interests, and risk of erroneous deprivation in
paternity proceedings in general."' The Court in Little did not consider
Mr. Little's particular situation. Nevertheless, in Lassiter the Court
,specifically stated that each parent-litigant will be evaluated individu-
ally."12 This novel application of Eldridge is completely contrary its
spirit and seems irreconcilable with the Court's traditional use of that
test.
Justice Blackmun also disagreed with the majority's presumption
that counsel should be appointed only when loss of physical liberty is
threatened. 13 The trend of prior Court decisions indicates there should
be no such presumption, though most of those decisions dealt with
criminal cases. Dissenting from denial of certiorari in Kaufman, Jus-
tice Black stated "the necessity of state-appointed counsel is particu-
larly acute in [child dependency proceedings].""' He found no pre-
sumption that court-appointed counsel was limited to cases involving
deprivation of physical liberty.
The Lassiter dissent also pointed out that loss of liberty was not
the only threat warranting court-appointed counsel. Justice Blackmun
cited Vitek, in which a plurality required appointment of counsel even
though transfer from prison to a mental hospital did not involve addi-
tional confinement."15 Vitek focused on the consideration that "[the
stigmatizing consequences of a transfer to a mental hospital for in-
voluntary psychiatric treatment, coupled with the subjection of the
prisoner to mandatory behavior modification as a treatment for mental
illness, constitute the kind of deprivations of liberty that [require] pro-
cedural protections."' "'0 The Vitek Court specifically stated the stigma
which attaches to mental hospital confinement raised the need for pro-
cedural protections." 7 It is arguable that just as great a stigma at-
taches to parents whose children are taken away by the state. The in-
voluntary loss of parental rights is perhaps even more severe than
Ill. Id. at 2208.
112. 101 S. Ct. at 2162.
113. Id. at 2166.
114. 402 U.S. at 959.
115. 101 S. Ct. at 2167.
116. 445 U.S. at 494.
117. Id.
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involuntary subjection to treatment for mental illness. Hospitalization
and treatment may be viewed as a helpful service, rather than a pun-
ishment, but loss of parental rights affords no such redemptive aspect
for the petitioner. Nevertheless, the majority presumed away the par-
ent's right to an appointed attorney while the prisoner's right was
preserved.
The dissent rebutted the majority's use of Gagnon in supporting its
conclusion that a presumption exists against appointment of counsel.,,
The Court in Gagnon held appointed counsel was not required, even
though revocation of parole or probation results in loss of physical lib-
erty. The dissent did not read Gagnon and Vitek as holding loss of
physical liberty the only factor to consider when determining whether
counsel should be appointed.11 9 Therefore, according to the dissent, the
majority erroneously decided such a presumption exists.1 0
Justice Blackmun offered another criterion for deciding whether
counsel should be appointed: the nature of the proceeding itself.12'
Compared with Gagnon, a termination of parental rights hearing is a
formal proceeding. In Gagnon technical rules of procedure and evi-
dence did not apply because of the informal nature of the parole revo-
cation hearing,122 whereas in Lassiter the North Carolina statute pro-
vided for formal and adversarial procedures to extinguish parental
rights. 2 3 Justice Blackmun pointed this out: "Indeed, the State here
has prescribed virtually all the attributes of a formal trial as befits the
severity of the loss at stake in the termination decision-every attri-
bute, that is, except counsel for the defendant parent. 1 24 A similar
view was held in Kaufman by Justice Black, who compared dependency
proceedings to criminal prosecutions. 125
118. 101 S. Ct. at 2166.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 2167.
122. 411 U.S. at 787. N.C. GEN. STAT. § § 7a-289.23; 7a-289.25; 7a-289.27(l);
la-1 Rule 1 (Supp. 1979); 101 S. Ct. at 2167.
123. 1d. The government initiates the proceeding by filing a petition and serving
a summons on the parent; a judge presides over the hearing and conducts the proceed-
ing pursuant to the formal rules of evidence and procedure.
124. Id. at 2168.
125. 402 U.S. at 959.
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Another troublesome element of the Lassiter majority's reasoning
was its application of Eldridge at all.126 Justice Blackmun did not take
exception to the application of the Eldridge standards to Lassiter.
However, in his own three-paragraph dissent, Justice Stevens1 27 recog-
nized that by employing the Eldridge balancing test, the majority
chose "an appropriate method of determining what process is due in
property cases. ' 128 This, of course, is not necessarily an appropriate
test where parental rights hang in the balance. Surely it seems logical
that when the Court addressed what due process was requisite when a
party stood to lose his Social Security disability payments 129-- a case
involving monetary losses-it did not calculate or intend that these
same criteria be applied when loss of parental rights was contemplated.
The majority could have relied on other precedents demonstrating
the loss of parental rights cannot be compared with loss of property;
the former is a much greater loss. Justice Blackmun acknowledged
these precedents, citing a series of cases that show loss of parental
rights has been considered a more grievous deprivation than the loss of
property.1 30 For example, in May v. Anderson 3 1 the Court acknowl-
edged that "[flights far more precious. . . than property rights will be
cut-off if [a parent] is to be bound by the Wisconsin award of custody
[to the other parent.]"132 The high degree of protection given parental
rights was also expressed in Stanley v. Illinois, 33 when the Court
stated: "It is plain that the interest of a parent in the companionship,
care, custody, and management of his or her children 'come[s] to this
126. 101 S. Ct. at 2159.
127. 101 S. Ct. at 2176.
128. Id. (emphasis added).
129. 424 U.S. at 349.
130. Id. at 2165. See May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528, 533, Meyer v. Nebraska,
262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Kovacs v.
Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 95 (1949); Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S.
816, 845 (1977); Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Prince v. Massa-
chusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35
(1925).
131. 345 U.S. 528. The Supreme Court held that a child custody decree of an-
other state need not be given full faith and credit when that decree was obtained in an
ex parte divorce action. Id. at 534.
132. Id. at 533.
133. 405 U.S. 645.
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Court with a momentum of respect lacking when appeal is made to
liberties which derive merely from shifting economic arrange-
ments.' "1u
It seems the standard for what degree of process is due should be
higher when the loss is parental rights rather than property rights. In
Goldberg v. Kelly,"3 5 the Court tied the applicable standard to the loss
suffered: "The extent to which procedural process must be afforded the
recipient is influenced by the extent to which he may 'be condemned to
suffer grievous loss,' . . . and depends upon whether the recipient's in-
terest in avoiding that loss outweighs the governmental interest in sum-
mary adjudication."'136 Using this test the majority necessarily would
have concluded that loss of parental rights is one of the most grievous
losses a human being can suffer: the highest standard of due process
should have been applied in Lassiter.
Neither the majority nor dissent compared deprivation in
Argersinger v. Hamlin"7 to deprivation in Lassiter, yet the comparison
is illuminating. In Argersinger, the defendant faced a $1,000 fine and/
or six months in jail. He was actually sentenced to ninety days in
jail."8 The mere possibility of that deprivation of liberty mandated ap-
pointment of counsel. If the Court had compared the loss in Lassiter to
the loss in Argersinger using the "grievous loss" test, surely the perma-
nent and absolute loss of parental rights would seem more severe than
a short term in prison. On this basis, the due process mandated in
Argersinger should have been extended to cases involving loss of paren-
tal rights.
The Lassiter Court could have stated simply and logically what
universal rules of human experience teach: the loss of a child is among
the most severe of all losses and requires the highest standard of proce-
dural protection. As the circuit court noted in Davis v. Page: "To offer
counsel when a single day in jail may be at stake, but to deny counsel
to an indigent when the destruction of his or her family is threatened,
134. Id. at 651 (citations omitted).
135. 397 U.S. 254 (1970). The Court determined in Goldberg that a pre-termi-
nation hearing must be provided prior to termination of financial aid under federally
assisted Aid to Families with Dependent Children program.
136. Id. at 2162-63. [citations omitted].
137. 407 U.S. at 26.
138. Id.
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does not accord with our concept of due process."1 39 Further justifica-
tion would hardly seem necessary, yet both the majority and dissent
chose instead to weigh due process requisites in light of the Eldridge
factors. Only Justice Stevens found no reason for weighing factors. He
stated, instead, that due process should be applied here as in a criminal
case.1 40 According to Justice Stevens "[t]he issue is one of fundamental
fairness, not of weighing the pecuniary costs against the societal bene-
fits. '141 To this writer, Stevens' proposition seems self-evident.
Having come to the opposite conclusion with regard to due process
right to counsel in termination proceedings in general, the dissent ex-
amined the implications of the majority's decision in view of Lassiter's
facts. Justice Blackmun made it clear that Ms. Lassiter could not han-
dle cross-examination. She did not present a defense; nor was she aided
or advised by the judge as to what she could do.142 In fact, as apparent
from the hearing transcript, the judge was quite rude to her.1 43
The majority concluded that presence of counsel could not have
made any difference in the outcome because the issues were not troub-
lesome and because Ms. Lassiter had no arguments to present.14 This
is conjecture. Counsel for Ms. Lassiter might have objected to the
hearsay testimony offered by the department's only witness. This evi-
dence comprised the major part of the state's case and was geared to
convincing the court that Ms. Lassiter's mother was unable to care ad-
equately for an additional child.1 45 Ms. Lassiter's mother denied this
allegation146 and counsel might have stressed both the denial and Ms.
Lassiter's interest in having her son returned to his brothers, sisters and
grandmother. It is possible that expert witnesses provided by defense
counsel might have testified that child rearing among family members
was eminently preferable to rearing in foster homes. Ms. Lassiter had
no real opportunity to present her case. Nevertheless the majority casu-
139. 640 F.2d at 604.
140. 101 S. Ct. at 2176.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 2174.
143. Id. at 2174 nn.24 and 25.
144. Id. at 2162-63.
145. Id. at 2173. The social workers hearsay came from unidentified community
members.
146. Id. at 2173.
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ally observed that the outcome would not have been different if counsel
had assisted.
Further, it is apparent the majority neglected the sage reasoning
of Armstrong v. Manzo, 47 where the Court stated due process required
litigants have an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in
a meaningful manner."14 It is inconceivable that the majority actually
perceived Ms. Lassiter's opportunity as meaningful.
The circuit court in Davis eloquently described the infirmities in-
herent in denying appointment of counsel in a case like Lassiter:
The State is represented by the State Attorney; it has access to
public records concerning the family and to the service of social
workers, psychiatrists, and psychologists. Those representing the
state have experience in legal proceedings and the ability to ex-
amine witnesses, present evidence, and argue skillfully that the
child should be adjudicated dependent. Unrepresented parents, in
contrast, will normally not cross-examine witnesses, submit evi-
dence, call witnesses, or present a defense. They do not understand
the rules of procedure or substantive law. They do not object to
improper questions or move to strike improper testimony ...
[T]hey may not even understand the legal significance and effect of
the proceedings.
Unless the indigent parent has the tools necessary to oppose
the state's expert presentation, a finding of dependency could be
based partially upon inadmissible hearsay, improper opinion evi-
dence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue of dependency, a determi-
nation of dependency might be founded upon testimony that a
skilled attorney would expose as biased or untrue. The parent may
have a defense sufficient to prevent an adjudication of dependency,
which he or she is unable adequately to present.149
The circumstances which Judge Tuttle described in Davis were
precisely what occurred in Lassiter. The basic truth of the fifth circuit's
words in Davis were self-evident and seemingly unassailable, yet the
147. 380 U.S. 545. The Court held in this case that failure to give notice to a
divorced parent that an adoption was pending deprived him of his parental rights with-
out due process.
148. Id. at 552.
149. 618 F.2d at 380-81.
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majority in Lassiter chose to ignore the import of this argument.
Finally, Justice Blackmun referred to Little v. Streater,1 50 finding
it ironic that the same day the Court decided a parent had no right to
appointed counsel in Lassiter, it also found an indigent man had a right
to state-paid blood-grouping tests taken in order to refute a charge of
paternity."' 1 In Little too the Court applied the Eldridge test but came
to a result opposite to Lassiter. The Court reasoned that absent the
blood-grouping tests the petitioner might erroneously be adjudged a
father:
Assessment of the Mathews v. Eldridge factors indicates that ap-
pellant did not receive the process he was constitutionally due.
Without aid in obtaining blood test evidence in a paternity case, an
indigent defendant, who faces the State as an adversary when the
child is a recipient of public assistance and who must overcome the
evidentiary burden Connecticut imposes, 'lacks a meaningful op-
portunity to be heard.' "152
Was Ms. Lassiter in less danger of an erroneous outcome than Mr.
Little? Blood group tests are often inconclusive with regard to pater-
nity.153 Whether or not the tests were performed Mr. Little might have
remained in the same position. In Lassiter it is clear damaging hearsay
evidence was admitted which may have prejudiced the outcome. The
majority nonetheless ignored the import of the erroneous decision ele-
ment and allowed greater procedural due process protection for Little
than for Lassiter. If the holdings of Little and Lassiter are suggestive
of the Court's hierarchy of values it may be argued the Lassiter major-
ity believed a higher standard of due process should be afforded when
parenthood is imputed than when it is terminated.
Conclusion
It is indeed unfortunate that an important issue-whether due pro-
cess requires the appointment of counsel for indigents in termination of
150. Id. at 2175 citing Little v. Streater, 101 S. Ct. 2202 (1981).
151. Id.
152. Little v. Streater, 101 S. Ct. at 2210 (citations omitted).
153. Id. at 2206.
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parental rights proceedings-was represented by a convicted murder-
ess. It is fascinating to speculate whether the majority would have de-
cided an obvious constitutional right to court-appointed counsel existed
in termination proceedings had this question been presented by a non-
felonious, hard-working, and exemplary petitoner. The Court should
have recognized that any petitioner, no matter how unappealing, has
the right to representation in this situation, in order to protect the right
to a meaningful hearing. When parents' rights to their children are
threatened the highest standards of procedural protection should be af-
forded without question, because the loss of a child is one of the most
tragic of all.
To those of us reaching adulthood in the post-Gideon generation, a
criminal trial without representation seems the most flagrant violation
of constitutional rights. The right to court-appointed counsel seems ba-
sic and its non-existence unimaginable; its hard-fought history is practi-
cally forgotten. The need for counsel in cases involving termination of
parental rights seems no less compelling than the need for counsel in
criminal cases. The Court's five-four decision in Lassiter makes it clear
that this compelling need, for the present, will remain unfulfilled.
Roselin Shoshanna Ehrlich*
* Professor Michael Masinter, Nova University Law School, graciously provided
the fifth circuit appellate briefs for Davis v. Page, as well as his invaluable guidance.
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